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ABSTRACT 
Most varieties of approximate reasoning in knowledge-based systems rely on 
if-then rules using some form of material implication in many-valued logic. We 
review material implication under three major logical systems: propositional logic, 
predicate logic, and set logic. Difficulties in the use of each of these for approxi- 
mate reasoning are discussed. Recent work by Zadeh and others in the concepts of 
usuality, regularity, and dispositional reasoning supports a new approach to 
approximate reasoning based on fuzzy set logic and regularity. This approach 
resembles nonmonotonic logic schemes uch as circumscription but differs in 
focusing on degrees of regularity and abnormality rather than using a two-valued 
logic. Regularity-conditioned inferences preserve important aspects for fuzzy modus 
ponens while eliminating the questionable inference modes of confirmation, de- 
nial presumption, and prejudice. We conclude the discussion with an example 
based on the relation between fast driving and poor fuel efficiency. 
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1. PROBLEMS OF  MATERIAL  IMPL ICAT ION 
In this section we review some paradoxes raised by the existence of 
nonstandard modes of inference in fuzzy propositional and predicate logics. 
The section concludes with a discussion of fuzzy set logic, which avoids these 
paradoxes at the cost of mandating a single implication operator, standard 
strict, which is too restrictive for some purposes. 
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1.1. Propositional Logic 
An implication rule in propositional logic takes the form " I f  (antecedent) 
then (consequent)," or " I f  A then C"  for short. Numerous systems of 
many-valued propositional logic exist; they differ largely in their choice of an 
implication function I giving the truth value of " I f  A then C"  as a function 
of the truth values of the antecedent A and the consequent C: Tr(A --* C) = 
I(Tr(A),Tr(C)). However, a common feature of all systems of material 
implication is "hybrid monotonicity;" I (Tr(A),  Tr(C)) varies directly with 
Tr(C) (the truth of the consequent) and inversely with Tr(A) (the truth of the 
antecedent). 
The mode of inference modus ponens defines a lower bound for Tr(C) as a 
function of Tr(A) and Tr(A ~ C). Similarly, modus tollens defines a lower 
bound for Tr(Not A), and hence an upper bound for Tr(A), as a function of 
Tr(Not C) and Tr(A ~ C). 
Several researchers have recently discussed two additional modes of infer- 
ence in many-valued logic (Bandler and Kohout [2], Hall [3], Schwartz [4], 
Whalen and Schott [5]). In confirmation, Tr(C) and Tr(A --, C) are used to 
compute a lower bound for Tr(A), whereas in denial, Tr(Not A) and 
Tr(A --. C) are used to compute an upper bound for Tr(C). 
Most of the power of confirmation and denial is captured by two simpler 
modes, presumption and prejudice [5], in which Tr(A ---, C) alone puts a 
lower limit on Tr(A) and an upper limit on Tr(C). These inference modes 
generalize the valid classical tautologies "Not (A---, C) - - '  A"  and "Not 
( A --, C) ~ Not C . "  Like confirmation and denial, presumption and prejudice 
have no deductive power when the implication is totally true. 
The six inference rules are summarized in the following inequalities: 
Modus ponens: Tr(C) 
Modus tollens: Tr(A) 
Confirmation: Tr(A) 
Denial: Tr(C) 
Presumption: Tr(A) 
Prejudice: Tr(C) 
_> mp(Tr(A), Tr(A ---, C)) 
_< mt (Tr(A), Tr(A) --* C)) 
_> mc(Tr(C), Tr(A ~ C)) 
< md(Tr(A), Tr(A ~ C)) 
> prs(Tr(A ~ C)) 
_< prj(Tr(A ~ C)) 
Note that 
mp(x ,0 )  = mc(x ,  1) = prs(1) = 0 
and 
mt(x ,0 )  = md(x,  1) = prj(1) = 1 
for all x (trivial cases). 
Presumption and prejudice lead to unfortunate consequences when man- 
valued logic is used for knowledge-based systems. Ordinarily when we give a 
truth value to an implication rule, we want higher truth values to generate 
stronger rules and lower truth values to generate weaker ones. However, 
Usuality, Regularity, and Fuzzy Set Logic 483 
lowering the truth value of an implication makes it a more powerful rule with 
respect to presumption, prejudice, confirmation, and denial, while it makes the 
rule weaker with respect o modus ponens and modus tollens. Even worse, 
presumption means that implications with low truth values generally entail 
unwanted restrictions on the input data. 
1.2. Predicate Logic 
The basic form of an implication rule under predicate logic is " I f  X is A 
then Y is C,"  or " I f  A(X)  then C(Y)" for short. X and Y are variables 
with their respective domains, and A and C are predicates that constrain the 
values of X and Y. The meaning is that if the predicate A is true of the 
quantity X, then the predicate C is also true of the quantity Y. Our focus will 
be on implication rules for approximate r asoning in which A and C are fuzzy 
predicates that impose elastic constraints on X and Y. If the variable X has 
some particular crisp value x, the truth of the predicate A, Tr( A( X)), is 
equal to the membership grade of the value x in the fuzzy set corresponding to
A, #A(X), and similarly for Y. As in propositional logic, the truth value 
of " I f  A(X) then C(Y)" is monotonically increasing in Tr(C(X))  and 
decreasing in Tr(A(X)) .  
Given any truth function I[Tr( A(X)) ,  Tr(C( Y))] representing implication, 
it is easy to compute a fuzzy subset, A ~ C, of the Cartesian product of the 
domains of X and Y: 
t.tA~c(Xi, yj) = I(#A(Xi), [£c(Yj))VXi in X,  yj in Y 
This membership grade is equal to the truth value of the implication " I f  x i 
belongs to the hypothetical value A then yj belongs to the hypothetical value 
C."  Under this interpretation, all six modes of inference discussed for 
propositional logic give perfectly valid bounds on the truth values of the 
antecedent or consequent for particular (x i, yj) pairs. 
However, in order to use the rule for applied reasoning, we need to combine 
it with fresh, external data about one variable (typically the antecedent variable 
X) in order to make inferences about the unknown value of the other vari- 
able. But this procedure leads to a paradox because whenever the assumed 
value for #A'~C' (Xi, Yj) is less than 1, presumption imposes a priori 
restrictions on the input values of X and prejudice restricts the output values 
of Y regardless of X. In a multirule system, the presumptions and prejudices 
imposed by the various rules may aggregate to form a "knowledge base 
psychosis" (Whalen and Schott [5]) in which no X value may be denied 
without violating the presumption of some rule and no Y value may be 
affirmed without violating some rule's prejudice! For a many-valued logical 
system to be both useful and logically grounded, a way must be found to 
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preserve modus ponens with respect o external data without simultaneously 
subjecting that data to presumption and prejudice. 
1.3. Set Logic 
In set logic, the concept of implication is replaced with the concept of set 
inclusion; the set logic relation that corresponds to " I f  A then C"  is "All A's 
are C's ,"  or " I f  p is an A then p is a C."  The objective-attribute-value 
(OAV) formalism allows us to draw a correspondence b tween set logic and 
propositional logic. If we define the set A in " I f  p is an A then p is a C" as 
the set of objects whose X attribute is in the set of X values A and define the 
set C as the set of objects whose Y attribute is in the set of Y values C, then 
the rule becomes " I f  Xp is in A then Yp is in C,"  where Xp and Yp are 
the values of the two attributes X and Y for a single object p; this allows us, 
for example, to distinguish the height Xp and weight Yp of a particular 
person p as well as to refer directly to the person p. 
The natural interpretation of " I f  p is an A then p is a C"  is that the 
membership grade of any object p in C is at least as great as its membership 
grade in A: 
#A(P) -< /~C (P)'*'p 
Defining A and C as before in terms of attributes X and Y, #A(P) = #A(XP) 
and #c(P) = IZc(YP), we can express the above rule in OAV form: 
#A( XP) <-- #~( Yp)¥p 
If we know the precise value of Xp, we can use modus ponens to make an 
inference about he value of Yp for the same object. The first step is to find the 
degree to which Xp belongs to A: Denote that membership grade as a. Note 
that a is also the membership grade of object p in A, and by the implication 
relation we can infer that the membership grade of p in C is greater than or 
equal to ct; in other words, p is an element of the a-level set C,,, defined as 
the set of objects whose membership n C is _> a. This in turn is equivalent to 
saying that p 's  value on attribute Y, Yp, belongs to the a-level set C~, the set 
of Y values that belong to C at least to degree a. Since a is here a crisp 
value, C~ is a crisp subset of the Y domain. In many applications A and C 
will be convex fuzzy sets, so a crisp value for Xp causes us to infer that Yp is 
contained in a particular crisp interval. 
If the value of Xp is given as a fuzzy subset A' of the domain of X values, 
the principle is the same although the procedure is more complicated. The 
fuzziness of our knowledge of Xp only allows us to infer that Yp belongs to a 
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fuzzy set of values C', which is given by 
C' = E sup 
I~A(X) = C~ 
where C~ is the or-level set defined by C a = {y: Pc(Y) >- or}. Translated 
back to membership function notation, this becomes 
Ix c"  (y) = sup {#A "(x)} 
x :  
?tA( X)~.ltc(y) 
One consequence of this is that if the peak of A' is outside the support of 
A, then C' is the special fuzzy set UNKNOWN: #c' (Y)  = 1 for all y. On the 
other hand, if A'  is a subset of A (/~A,(x) -< /~A(x) for all x), then C' = C. 
Figure 1 illustrates fuzzy set inference for some simple triangle fuzzy sets. 
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The inferred C' that we obtain from this method for any A, A', and C is 
exactly the same as that obtained from fuzzy predicate modus ponens with the 
same values when the implication operator used is the standard strict operator: 
so that 
[AA---,c(Xi, Yj) = I10 
if #c(Yj) >- #A(Xi) 
if/ZC(yj) < #A(Xi) 
#c" (Yi) = sup {~.4" (x,)} 
I~A ~c( Xi, yj)= 1 
Despite this equivalence, the problems posed by the modes of presumption 
and prejudice do not arise, because a score of zero for a particular (x i, yj) pair 
does not entail the denial of any implication relation but rather asserts that no 
objects in the domain have that particular combination of attributes. The fact 
that no implication relations are given truth values less than 1 also results in the 
exclusion of confirmation and denial. 
To summarize, fuzzy set logic succeeds in preserving eneralizations of the 
valid classical forms modus ponens and modus tollens while eliminating 
the aberrant forms confirmation, denial, presumption, and prejudice. But by 
mandating the standard strict implication operator, it incurs the cost of 
requiring a degree of  crispness in fuzzy implication that, although convenient 
for some applications, is quite inappropriate in others. 
2. USUALITY 
Nearly all rules, or even facts, have exceptions. The usefulness of a rule or a 
fact in the imperfect world in which we live is that it is (hoped to be) usually 
true. A frequently used example of such statements is the statement "birds can 
fly." If this statement is interpreted according to traditional logic, it must be 
given either the trivial meaning "some birds can fly" (which conveys no more 
information than the equally true "some mammals can fly") or else the 
meaning "all birds can fly," which is a false statement. Attempts to deal with 
this problem can be broadly divided into two approaches, which can be called 
the "nonmonotonic logic" approach and the "approximate reasoning" 
approach. 
In nonmonotonic logic (Ginsberg [6]), the statement "birds can fly" is taken 
as a default rule, that is, as a license to tentatively infer that "Tweety can fly" 
is true given the fact that Tweety is a bird and an absence of any evidence 
that Tweety cannot fly (e.g., Tweety is not known to be an ostrich or to 
have a broken wing). If Tweety's previously healthy wing is broken in an 
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accident, "Tweety can fly" is no longer true, nor is any proposition inferred 
from "Tweety can fly." The ability of propositions to change from "true" or 
"proved" to "false" or "unproved" is a key characteristic of temporal logic, 
which is the least controversial variety of nonmonotonic logic. On the other 
hand, if we learn instead that Tweety is a penguin, we must also (more 
apologetically) retract he inference that Tweety can fly and all propositions 
depending on it. This is the epistemological variety of nonmonotonic logic, in 
which propositions change from being believed to be true to being believed to 
be false. 
Within the field of approximate reasoning, Zadeh and others have devoted 
much attention to a theory of usuality that imputes explicit or implicit fuzzy 
quantifiers to simple or compound propositions (Zadeh [7, 8]. Zadeh proposes 
that the fuzzy quantifier "most"  be added to statements of disposition, yielding 
in the above case the fuzzy proposition "most birds can fly." More specifi- 
cally, this statement asserts that the ratio of the number of flying birds to the 
number of all birds whether flying or not belongs to a particular fuzzy subset of 
the unit interval, called "most ."  
A major advantage of this approach is that the argument extends easily to 
fuzzy statements such as "small birds are agile flyers," which becomes "most 
small birds are agile flyers." The ratio of interest in the latter statement is the 
"relative sigma count" obtained by 
1. Finding the degree of membership of each bird in the fuzzy set of small 
birds 
2. Finding the degree of membership of each bird in the intersection of the 
fuzzy set of small birds with the fuzzy set of agile flyers 
3. Finding the arithmetic sum of all the membership grades in the fuzzy set 
found in step 1 
4. Finding the arithmetic sum of all the membership grades in the fuzzy set 
found in step 2 
5. Dividing the sum obtained in step 4 by the sum obtained in step 3. 
The existence of the rule "most small birds are agile flyers" saves us the 
trouble of going through these steps by assuring us that the resulting ratio 
belongs to the fuzzy set "most."  And the rule remains a good one despite the 
existence of small birds such as the rail, which is a very weak flyer, and the 
kiwi, which is flightless. 
Zadeh's ystem of usuality calculation is also useful for approximate r ason- 
ing involving several premises. Consider the following syllogism: 
Icy roads are slippery 
Slippery roads are dangerous 
Icy roads are dangerous 
If the two premises are formalized in terms of the nonfuzzy universal quanti- 
fier, then the conclusion is universally valid. If the nonfuzzy existential 
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quantifier is used, we cannot even validly conclude that some icy roads are 
dangerous. Zadeh [7] discusses the results of interpreting the linguistic state- 
ments as dispositions with implied fuzzy quantifiers. Thus, the propositions 
"icy roads are slippery" and "slippery roads are dangerous" become "most 
icy roads are slippery" and "most slippery roads are dangerous." 
These quantifiers are then combined mathematically to quantify the fuzzy 
proposition of the time that icy roads are dangerous. By Zadeh's notation, this 
proportion belongs to the fuzzy subset of the unit interval denoted (2most e 
1); that is, one less than twice the fuzzy proportion "most"  (Zadeh [7, p. 
759]). 
Zadeh's approach to usuality is a major contribution to the problem of 
accounting for commonsense r asoning. However, it leaves several important 
concerns unresolved. The first step of these is the fact that the technique is 
restricted to crisp domains or fuzzy domains in which the membership grades 
are real numbers on a ratio scale. Second, even within such a domain it is 
difficult to interpret he relative sigma count ratio as a numeric, rather than 
linguistic, quantity. The ratio of the number of flying birds to the total number 
of birds is equal to 100% unless the ratio is carried out to a large number 
of decimal places, since flightless birds comprise only a few species (and 
none of the flightless species is a particularly common one). To a reasonable 
degree of roundoff accuracy, the probability that a randomly selected bird will 
fly is 1.00. As a subjective certainty factor, we are absolutely sure that birds 
can fly. Nevertheless, everyone knows that some birds cannot fly, and what is 
more, most people find this fact quite interesting! 
The natural fascination that most observers feel for penguins and kiwis leads 
us to the third concern, which is the status of exceptions to the rule. The 
concern with exceptions takes on a somewhat more practical turn in the icy 
roads example; it is really not as important for a driver to calculate what 
proportion of icy roads are dangerous as to be able to conclude that icy roads 
are not very safe, and perhaps also to be able to recognize the exceptions to the 
rule, such as driving on a deserted, well-banked icy road using tire chains. 
While Zadeh's main discussions of usuality center on the relative sigma 
count, he also introduces another concept hat offers a potential solution to 
the dilemmas of usuality, and also those of fuzzy implication discussed in 
Section 1. This is the concept of conditioned usuality: 
More generally, however, usually connotes a dependence on the 
assumption of 'normality.' More specifically, let Z denote what might 
be called a conditioning variable whose normal (or regular) value is R, 
where R in general is a fuzzy set which is the complement of a set of 
exceptions. In terms of the conditioning variable, the dispositional 
valuation(usually) (X is F) may be expressed as 
(usually) (X  is F) ',-, if (Z is R) then (most X 's  are F) 
(Zadeh [7, p. 756]) 
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In this form, the fact "X  is F"  is given two distinct qualifications: a logical 
hedge " I f  (Z is R ) "  and a statistical hedge "most ."  In the remainder of this 
paper we shall no longer be concerned with the statistical proportion of the 
time a fact or rule is correct; instead, we shall concentrate on explaining 
the exceptions in terms of the conditioning variable Z. In applications where 
statistically variations are an important aspect of the rule rather than just 
"irregular exceptions," we will consider the usual probability distribution to 
be part of the predicate F. Thus, the well-known advice to poker players 
"Don't  draw to an inside straight" becomes " I f  the deal is honest then the 
probability of successfully drawing to an inside straight is negligibly small." A 
player who succeeds at this move once may be considered lucky; if a player 
makes a habit of successfully doing so, the other players have grounds for 
suspecting that something irregular is going on! 
Although the details differ because the present concern is with grades of 
regularity or irregularity measured by grades of membership of Z in R rather 
than the use of two-valued nonmonotonic logic, the treatment of (ir)regularity 
has a parallel in McCarthy's "abnormal" predicate used in the theory of 
circumscription (McCarthy [9]). 
3. REGULARITY  IN FUZZY SET LOGIC 
3.1. Implication 
The concept of conditioned usuality discussed above enables us to give fuzzy 
set logic most of the power and flexibility of fuzzy predicate logic without 
introducing the undesirable paradoxes and restrictions imposed by presumption 
and prejudice. The essential first step is to interpret he linguistic rule " I f  A 
then C"  as a regularity-qualified set inclusion relation in object-attribute-value 
form: 
" I f  Xp is in A then as a rule Yp is in C . "  
We take this to mean that if p is an A without being a C then there must be 
some irregular characteristic about p that explains this. Thus, the rule can 
be restated as 
If Xp is in A and Zp is in R then Yp is in C. 
The power of this formalism for representing fuzzy knowledge stems from 
the fact that Z and R do not need to be specified in the linguistic rule. 
Although in practice an expert's rule may have many clauses in the antecedent 
( " I f  A1 and A2 and A3 and . . ,  then C") ,  there are almost always many 
other conditions left out; these are the proverbial "other things" in the 
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time-honored hedge "other things being equal" (ceteris paribus). ~ Only when 
the rule fails seriously do the details of Z and R come under close examina- 
tion, whether for improving the rule base through knowledge refinement or 
merely for special pleading and excuse-making. 
Expressed in terms of membership functions, the linguistic rule " I f  X is A 
then as a rule Y is C"  asserts that every object p belongs to the set C at least 
as much as it belongs to the intersection of the set A and the set R of 
"regular" objects: 
PAR(P) ~ Pc (P )  
We can readily equate Pc(P) to Pc(YP) as before; similarly, PA(P) is equal 
to pA(XP). By analogy, let PR(P)equal pR(Zp), the degree to which "other 
things" about p (Zp) are "as usual" (R). Given an appropriate choice of 
T-norm A (Schweizer and Sklar [10], Bonissone [l l]) (see Table l) to 
represent "and,"  
PAR(P) = A(PA(XP),PR(ZP)) 
we can express the rule in terms of the attributes Xp, Zp, and Yp: 
A( pA( XP), pR( Zp) ) <-- pc( Yp)Vp 
3.2. Modus Ponens: Fuzzy Rules and Crisp Data 
The simplest case of modus ponens using this rule arises when we know the 
precise value of Xp and (less realistically) we also know PR(P), the degree to 
which p belongs to R; in other words, we know precisely how "regular" p 
is. In this case, we can find the membership grade of p in A by the 
membership grade of Xp in A, pA(Xp). Now if we define ct to be 
the membership grade of p in the intersection set AR, we have PAR(P) = 
t~ = A(pA(Xp), PR(P)), and therefore Pc(P) -> c~. p is therefore inferred to 
belong to the level set of C a of objects, which means that Yp must belong 
to the corresponding level set of Y values. 
Next, consider the case where we know the precise value of Xp of X and 
thus can find PA(P) = PA(XP), but we have no knowledge about how regular 
or irregular an object p is. If we were to take the absolutely typical value of 
Zp as a default, this would make PR(P) equal to 1, returning us to the 
previous case of standard strict logic. Instead of picking any one specific crisp 
value for the default regularity, we take the view that it is not at all irregular to 
be not at all irregular; it is mildly irregular to be mildly irregular; and it is very 
ISee Dubois and Prade [1, pp. 70-72] for alternative approach toceteris paribus rules. 
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irregular to be very irregular. More formally, this means we consider R to be a 
second-order fuzzy set. Let the grade of membership of an individual 
p (whose precise degree of regularity is not given) be equal to the special 
fuzzy set of membership grades "unitor" defined as ~/ /3  (Zadeh [12]): 
/xa(p) = ~/ /3 .  Note that any element ~ of the lattice of membership grades 
(commonly the unit interval) belongs to unitor to a degree equal to /3 itself. 
An alternative way to justify the use of unitor for the membership grade of a 
general p in R is by setting the default value of Zp equal to R, the fuzzy set 
of regular values of Zp. Substituting R for Zp, we have 
#a(p) = lzR(Zp) = #R(R) 
the degree to which the fuzzy set R is a member of itself. Evaluating this 
means applying the function /~R to a fuzzy subset of its domain. This procedure 
has been defined by the extension principle o f fuzzy mathematics (Kandel 
[13, p. 16]), which allows any function of f(v) defined on a domain V to be 
extended to a function defined on the fuzzy power set of that domain; in other 
words, it allows us to substitute a fuzzy set of values of the argument into the 
function and obtain a fuzzy result. I f  W is a fuzzy subset of V with 
membership function #w(I)i), 
w = E 
i 
then 
f (W)  = E #w(vi)If(vi) 
i 
if f is one-to one. If  f is many-to-one, the membership of a particular value 
of f(o) may have more than one membership grade by this formula; in this 
case we take the supremum of all such membership grades, yielding the 
general form of the extension principle: 
f(w) = E sup {.w(O}/f(o,) 
i j: 
f(vj) =f(vi) 
I f  we take the domain V= {vi} to be Z = {zi} and replace f(v i) with 
I~R(Zi) in this general formula, we obtain the fuzzy membership grade in R of 
W, where W is any arbitrary subset of Z: 
 R(w) = Y sup 
i j :  
~R(zj) = ~R(zi) 
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Now we can substitute R for W and find the fuzzy membership grade of R 
in itself: 
/~R(R) = Y~ sup {~R(Zj)}/~tR(Zi) 
i j :  
v-R(z./) = P,e(z~) 
= . . ( z , ) /u . ( z3  
i 
If we define {3i = t'tR(Zi), this can be written 
. . (n )  = Z/3,1/3,  
i 
which can be abbreviated as Z~/3/{3 as long as R is "surjective": a 
continuous normal fuzzy set with a normal complement. The important point is 
that this result holds regardless of the details of the fuzzy set R! 
The next step is to find /~Aa(P). By substitution, we have 
¢ 
Since ~A(Xp) is assumed to be a known crisp constant here, we can treat 
/~a(p) as a function of the fuzzy value #R(R). If A is one-to-one (e.g., if A is 
the product T-norm 7"2) , we can use the simpler form of the extension 
principle to obtain the formula 
, . . . (p)  = Z /3 /a ( ,A (xp) . /3 )  
In other words, a particular individual p whose X attribute takes the precise 
value Xp has a membership grade in AR that is unknown but that is restricted 
by a fuzzy set of membership grades that is dependent upon the known value 
~A(XP) and the unknown value ttR(Zp). Each particular value /3 of t~R(Zp) 
gives us a candidate for the membership of p in AR, A(~tA(Xp), {3). The 
degree to which A(~tA(XP), /3) belongs to the fuzzy set of membership grades 
of p in AR is equal to/3. In particular, ~A(XP) has a membership grade of 1 
in /ZAR (p),  and 0 has a membership grade of 0. 
But, since some T-norms are many-to-one functions of one argument when 
the other is held constant (e.g., the Lukasiewicz T-norm Tt and the min 
T-norm T3), the correct formula is 
/~A.(P) = ~ sup{/3': A( t~A( XP), /3') = A( I~A( XP), /3) } /A( t~A( Xp), [3) 
t3 
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If we again define a to be equal to A(#A(XP), 1~) and use it as our index 
variable, we obtain the simpler formula 
#An(P) = ~ sup{ B': A(#A(XP),  B') = or}/a 
t~t 
Since A is monotonically increasing in both its arguments, it is permissible to 
replace the equality constraint by an inequality within the supremum: 
PAiz(P) = Z sup{13": A(PA( XP), fl') < ot}/t~ 
O/ 
The advantage of this is that sup{/5': A(#,4(XP) ,/3') < a} is algebraically 
equivalent to the R-implication function I(#A(Xp), or) corresponding to the 
T-norm A (Trillas and Valverde [14]) (see Table 1), which enables us to 
simplify the membership formula to 
#An(P) = Z I(#A(XP), ol)/ot 
t2t 
Applying the inference rule /~c(P) > #Aa(P), we obtain the follow- 
ing fuzzy set of lower bounds for p 's  membership grade in the fuzzy set of 
objects C: 
#c(P)  > ~ I(#A(XP), a)/a 
Ot 
The same fuzzy set of lower bounds also applies to the membership grade 
of Yp in the fuzzy set of Y values C: 
#c(rp) >- Z I(#A(XP), a)/ot 
Ot 
Each element a of this fuzzy set of membership grades corresponds to a level 
set C,~ = { Y:#c(Y) > a}. Using the resolution identity of fuzzy mathematics 
(Zadeh [15]), we can combine these level sets according to the membership 
grades of their corresponding ~'s to form the fuzzy set C', which is our best 
inference of the value of Yp: 
C' = Z I(.A(XP), ~)C~ 
Ol 
3.3. Modus Ponens: Fuzzy Rules and Fuzzy Data 
Finally, let us consider the most general case, in which our knowledge about 
the value of p 's  X attribute consists only of a fuzzy restriction A' on the 
value of Xp. Once again we use the fuzzy set R as the default value for Zp. 
Substituting these fuzzy values into the equation 
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leads to the derivation 
#An(P) = A[gA(A ' ) 'gR(R)]  
which by the extension principle is equal to 
]LAR(P) = Z A[I~A" (X)'~R(Z)]/A[ILA(X)'tLR(Z)] 
X,Z  
Note that /xR(z) is identical in both the formula for a candidate membership 
grade AlgA(X), gR(Z)] and the formula A[g,4,(x), gR(z)], which gives that 
membership grade's own membership grade in gAR, (P), p's membership 
grade in the second-order fuzzy set AR. This identify allows us to simplify the 
above expression by letting /5 = txR(z): 
gA,(P) = Z a[gA" (X),/SI/A["A(X),/3] 
x ,~ 
Next, we can eliminate duplications in the right-hand side of this equation, 
since an element o~'s actual membership grade in the resultant fuzzy set is the 
largest membership associated with it in the fuzzy union Z: 
#AR(P) = ~ sup {A[/x A • (X), /51}/c~ 
Ot X, ~; 
A[t~A(X), BI =c~ 
The supremum constrained by equality can be converted into a supremum 
constrained by inequality: 
gAn(") = ~ sup  {A[# A • (X ) ,  /5 ]} /o~ 
ZX[ttA(X), /31 _<c~ 
For any x, the /5 that simultaneously maximizes A[gA,(X), /3] while guaran- 
teeing that A[gA(X), /3 < c~] is 
{3 = I(gA(X ), or) : sup{/5:A[/xA(X),/5 ] --< c~} 
which allows us to simplify the supremum over x and /3 to a supremum over x 
alone in the preceding formula: 
gAR(P) = Z sup{A[gA" (X)'I(tXA(X)'Ot)]}/CZ 
Ot X 
Applying the implication rule for set inclusion, we have 
gc(P)  > Z sup{A[gA" (X)'I(#A(X)'OI)]}/O~ 
O¢ X 
In terms of Y values, this becomes 
~,c(Yp) >_ ~, sup{A[ttA" (X),l(gA(X),Ol)]}/Ol 
Ot X 
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We can now construct the level set of C~ corresponding toeach c~ and join 
them together using the resolution identity to find C', the (first-order) fuzzy set 
of Y values satisfying the above relation: 
C' = Z sup{A[#A" (x) , I (#A(x) , . ) ]}C.  
X 
The membership of a particular Y value y in C' is equal to the membership 
of the highest level set of C that contains y; this is the level set whose c~ is 
equal to #c(Y). This level set, and hence y itself, belongs to C' to the degree 
#¢"  (Y) = sup{A[# A • (x),I(#A(x),#c(Y))]} 
x 
3.4. Comparison with Fuzzy Predicate Logic 
C', the fuzzy set of Y values inferred by regularity-conditioned fuzzy set 
logic, is algebraically equal to the result that would be obtained by modus 
ponens under fuzzy predicate logic with the same A, A', and C and the same 
T-norm, R-implication pair. Nevertheless, there is an important difference. In 
fuzzy predicate logic, I(#A(x), #c(Y)) is the truth value of the implication " I f  
x is compatible with our knowledge of X then y is compatible with our 
knowledge of Y" ;  as we have seen, any truth value other than 1 causes 
presumption to impose an a priori constraint on our knowledge of X by 
placing a lower bound on the truth of the antecedent, and prejudice's upper 
bound on the truth of the consequent likewise imposes an a priori constraint on 
our knowledge of Y. In regularity-conditioned fuzzy set logic, on the other 
hand, I(#A(X), #c(Y)) is the upper bound on the regularity of an object 
whose X attribute has the value x and whose Y attribute has the value of y; 
in other words, 1-1(#A(x),#c(y) ) measures how irregular an object 
would have to be to possess this combination of attributes and still satisfy 
#AR(P) ~ /Xc(P)- 
In summary, the regularity-conditioned fuzzy set logic formulation allows us 
to derive modus ponens characteristics identical with those of fuzzy predicate 
logic for any R-implication while avoiding the undesirable implications of 
presumption and prejudice. 
Figure 2 summarizes three ways that the crisp implication " I f  p is an A 
then it is a C"  (front lower left) may be hedged, together with how these 
hedges combine. The horizontal dimension, labeled "crispness," distinguishes 
implications involving crisp sets A and C on the left from the implications 
involving fuzzy sets on the right. The vertical dimension, labeled "regularity," 
distinguishes implications that do not depend on ceteris paribus assumptions 
on the bottom from implications that hold only insofar as such assumptions are 
satisfied; the latter appear on the top of the cube. And the third dimension 
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distinguishes deterministic mplications in the front plane (lower left in projec- 
tion) from probabilistic implications in the rear plane. 
4. EXAMPLE:  FAST DRIVING IMPLIES POOR FUEL ECONOMY 
In [5], we drew inferences from versions of the fuzzy rule " I f  you drive fast 
you will have poor fuel economy" under fuzzy propositional, predicate, and 
set logic. In the case of predicate or propositional logic, presumption and 
prejudice put restrictions on the applicability of the rule, whereas fuzzy set 
logic mandated the use of standard strict logic. In the present discussion, 
we will examine how the introduction of regularity qualification alters the 
situation. 
Figure 3 shows the linguistic value "fast" defined on a domain of speeds 
measured in miles per hour; Figure 4 shows the linguistic value "poor"  
defined over fuel economies measured in miles per gallon. Consider the rule 
"People who drive fast have poor fuel economy" defined using these fuzzy 
sets. Despite the fuzziness of its clauses, the rule itself can be taken as an 
absolute rule insisting that/~ooor(YP) >- P'fast(XP), where Yp is a person's fuel 
economy on a particular trip and Xp is that person's peed on the same trip. 
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Figure 3. Membership grades in the linguistic value "fast." 
This is displayed in Table 2 for various combinations of speed and fuel 
economy; an entry of 1 means that the combination is allowed by the absolute 
fuzzy rule, and an entry of 0 shows that the combination is prohibited. When 
such a rule is used for modus ponens with hedged versions of "fast" (such as 
"very fast" or "moreorless fast"), the inferred fuel economy equals that 
described by the same hedge applied to the consequent "poor"  (i.e., respec- 
tively, "very poor" and "moreorless poor") (Whalen and Schott [5]). 
However, using the results of this paper, it is possible to take a softer view 
of the rule: "People who drive fast typically have poor fuel economy." This 
form of the rule admits of exceptions in atypical situations uch as coasting 
down the side of a mountain or traveling in the wake of a large truck. Table 3 
shows the maximum degree of regularity associated with the same selected 
combinations of speed and economy analyzed in Table 2. In each block of 
Table 3, the first line repeats the 0 to 1 associated with standard strict logic, 
while the other three lines give the maximum regularity compatible with the 
use of the Lukasiewicz, product, and minimum T-norms to define the "and" 
of "fast and regular" (Whalen and Schott [5], Schweizer and Sklar [10, 16]). 
Table 3 may be easier to conceptualize in terms of the complement of the 
degree of regularity, which is the degree to which a situation is exceptional. 
For example, achieving a fuel economy of 25 mpg while driving 60 mph is 
assigned a maximum regularity of 0.692 according to the Lukasiewicz T-norm, 
which means that a trip having these characteristics must belong at least 0.308 
to the fuzzy set of exceptional trips. The numbers in Table 3 are numerically 
equal to the corresponding implication truth values in the standard strict, 
1 
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Figure 4. Membership grades in the linguisitic value "poor." 
Usuality, Regularity, and Fuzzy Set Logic 
Table 2. Possible Combinations of Speeds and Fuel Economies 
(Standard Strict Logic) 
499 
Fuel Economy (mpg) 
Speed 15.00 15.12 15.34 15.98 18.84 25.00 30.00 35.00 mpg 
mph Fast 1 0.994 0.983 0.951 0.808 0.500 0.250 0 Poor 
50 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
53.09 0.250 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
56.18 0.500 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
60 0.808 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
70 0.951 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
80 0.983 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
90 0.994 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1o0 1 1 0 o o 0 o 0 o 
Lukasiewicz, quotient, and Brouwer fuzzy predicate logics, respectively 
(see Table 1), but the interpretations are quite different. 
4.1.  Modus  Ponens  
Suppose we wish to deduce the fuel economy for a trip when we know that 
the speed is exactly 60 mph and (less realistically) we also know that the 
degree of regularity of the situation is 0.8. Since /~fast(60)= 0.808 and 
t~R(Zp) = 0.8, this situation belongs to the set of situations that are "regular 
fast trips" to the degree A(0.808, 0.8). If we let A be the Lukasiewicz 
T-norm, this membership is max (0, 0.808 + 0.8 - 1) = 0.608. This means 
that the corresponding fuel economy has a membership in "poor"  of at least 
0.608. Examination of Figure 4 shows that the 0.608 level set of "poor"  is the 
interval from 0 mpg to approximately 22 mpg. 
Next we consider the situation where the speed is 60 mph but the regularity 
is unspecified. The membership of this situation in " fast"  is again 0.808, 
but the membership of the situation in "regular" is taken by default to 
be the fuzzy membership grade "unitor." Using Lukasiewicz T-norm, 
A(0.808, unitor) is equal to the fuzzy set of membership grades depicted in 
Figure 5. Taking this membership grade to be the lower bound on the 
membership of the corresponding fuel economy in "poor , "  we obtain 
the fuzzy set of fuel economies depicted in Figure 6. In this fuzzy set, each 
fuel economy  has a membership grade equal to tZpoor(y) • (1-0.808), where 
• denotes bounded sum. Note in particular that all fuel economies below 
approximately 19 mpg (the 0.808 level set of "poor" )  belong completely to 
the inferred set of potential fuel economies, while fuel economies over 35 mpg 
(which do not belong at all to "poor" )  belong to the inferred set with a 
membership grade of 0.192. 
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Figure 8. Membership grades in the fuel economy inferred for "moreorless fast." 
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Finally, we consider two situations in which our knowledge of the speed of a 
trip is given by a linguistic hedge applied to the basic set " fast ,"  and our 
knowledge about regularity is unspecified as before. Figure 7 repeats the fuzzy 
set of " fast"  speed together with two other fuzzy sets of speeds denoted 
"moreorless fast" and "very fast," found, respectively, by taking the square 
root and the square of the sampled membership grades (Tables 2 and 3) and 
interpolating linearly between these points. 
Using the methods described in the body of the article, when the given 
datum is that the speed is "very fast," the inferred fuzzy set of potential fuel 
economies is "poor"  (Figure 4), whether the T-norm used is Lukasiewicz, 
product, or minimum. 2 On the other hand, when the given datum is that the 
speed is "moreorless fast," the inferred fuzzy set of potential fuel economies 
is as shown in Figure 8. For the product and minimum T-norms, the result is 
identical to the set "moreorless poor," while for the Lukasiewicz T-norm the 
result is as shown in the upper line: equal to "moreorless poor" for member- 
ship grades above 0.5 but greater (vaguer) than "moreorless poor" for 
lower membership grades. In summary, a datum that is included in the 
antecedent fuzzy set gives an inference equal to the consequent fuzzy set, 
whereas a datum that is vaguer than the antecedent yields an inference that is 
vaguer than the consequent. 
Since the results of regularity-conditioned fuzzy set logic under modus 
ponens are identical to the results of fuzzy predicate logic using R-implications 
and the appropriate modus ponens generating functions, the problems of 
scaling up to a knowledge-based system of practical size and scope are also the 
same. While by no means trivial, these problems are being studied by a 
number of highly competent researchers; see Bonnisonne [11], Smets and 
Magrez [17], Wu [18], and Dubois and Prade [19] for some recent results in 
this area. 
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